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Conservative Feminism
Hon. Richard A. Posner [
My title may seem an oxymoron: Does not conservatism imply
the rejection of feminism? Some brands of conservatism do; many
social and religious conservatives believe that a woman's place is in
the home. No one harboring such a belief would be likely to de-
scribe himself or herself as a feminist. But conservatives who con-
sider themselves libertarians-conservatives in the classical liberal
tradition of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill (a distinguished femi-
nist), Herbert Spencer (another pioneering feminist1 ) and Milton
Friedman-do not believe that law or government should prescribe
a particular role for women or discourage them from exercising free
choice regarding occupation, marriage, and style of life. Nor, how-
ever, do they believe that women should be put ahead of men or
encouraged to lead separate lives from men, or that "what's good
for women" should be the lodestar for social governance instead of
"what's good for the United States" or "what's good for human-
kind." Nor do they have much faith in the power of government to
put things right. The libertarian, noting that the history of legisla-
tion and common law with respect to women has indeed been one
of oppression and discrimination, is not optimistic that the law can
be flipped over and become an engine of liberation. The libertarian
also notes that women are so large and diverse a part of the popu-
lation and their welfare is so entwined with men-particularly
their sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers-that it is hard to im-
agine what kind of legislation or legal rules could be devised that
would benefit women as a group, unless society as a whole
benefited.
So what is "conservative feminism"? It is, I suggest, the idea
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School. This is the revised text of remarks delivered on October 15,
1988, at the Symposium on Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism, sponsored
by The University of Chicago Legal Forum. The helpful comments of Frank Easterbrook,
Richard Epstein, William Landes, Edward Lazear, Stephen McAllister, Charlene Posner,
Judith Resnik, Eva Saks and Cass Sunstein, and the research assistance of Ricardo Barrera,
are gratefully acknowledged.
See the much-maligned Herbert Spencer, Social Statics ch 16 (Robert Schalkenbach
Foundation, 1954) (advocating equal rights for women).
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that women are entitled to political, legal, social, and economic
equality to men, in the framework of a lightly regulated market
economy. It is the libertarian approach to issues of feminist juris-
prudence, provided that "libertarian" is understood to refer to a
strong commitment to markets rather than to some natural-rights
or other philosophical underpinning of such a commitment. The
implications of such an approach are not limited to narrowly "eco-
nomic" issues such as comparable worth, although those issues are
important and some are neglected by other forms of feminism. The
implications extend, as we shall see, to the headiest heights of ju-
risprudential speculation, where the question whether women have
a fundamentally different outlook on law from men is being de-
bated. My discussion is in three parts: employment; the family and
sex; and the nature of law.
I. EMPLOYMENT
There should be no legal barriers to the employment of
women. Laws that forbade women to work in dangerous occupa-
tions, or to work as long hours as men,2 were for the most part
either paternalistic or designed to reduce competition faced by
male workers.' This was eventually recognized, and the laws have
been repealed; but a subtler barrier to female employment re-
mains. I refer to the fact that housewives' imputed earnings are
not taxed. This may seem an esoteric and impractical-if not
downright provocative-topic with which to begin an examination
of feminist jurisprudence; but we shall see that it illustrates the
limitations of more familiar forms of feminist jurisprudence and
social thought.
It is plain that housewives do useful work, in the sense of work
for which families pay-as by forgoing the income that the house-
wife could earn in the market." A lower-bound estimate of its value
See Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412 (1908).
See Elisabeth M. Landes, The Effect of State Maximum-Hours Laws on the Employ-
ment of Women in 1920, 88 J Pol Econ 476 (1980).
1 One estimate is that a full-time housewife contributes, on average, 40 percent of the
full (that is, pecuniary plus nonpecuniary) income of the household. Calculated from Reu-
ben Gronau, Home Production-A Forgotten Industry, 62 Rev Econ & Stat 408 (1980). But
the reader should be warned of the variety of estimates of housewives' imputed earnings,
and of the lurking methodological problems. See, for example, Ann Chadeau, Measuring
Household Activities: Some International Comparisons, 31 Rev Income & Wealth 237
(1985); Marianne A. Ferber and Carole A. Greene, Housework vs. Marketwork: Some Evi-
dence How the Decision is Made, 29 Rev Income & Wealth 147 (1983); Martin Murphy,
The Value of Nonmarket Household Production: Opportunity Cost Versus Market Cost
Estimates, 24 Rev Income & Wealth 243 (1978).
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is, indeed, the amount housewives would earn in a world without
income taxes if they entered the market. (It is a lower bound be-
cause a given woman might be more productive in the household
than in the market.) Because the housewife's "earnings" in the
home are not taxed, however, women will stay at home even when
they would be worth more in the market. For example, suppose the
value of a housewife's work is $40,000 a year; her earnings in the
market (net of all expenses associated with market work- com-
muting costs, etc.) would be $50,000; and she would be in the 28
percent income tax bracket if she did enter the market. Then her
after-tax income would be lower in the market than at home, and
she will stay home even though she is worth more in the market."
Although this distortion could be eliminated or at least re-
duced by taxing housewives' imputed earnings, the measurement
problems would be formidable, to say the least. Otherwise there
would be no economic explanation for failing to tax all significant
nonpecuniary goods, notably leisure. Even if there were no formi-
dable problems of measurement, however, a tax on nonpecuniary
income would be greatly resented because few taxpayers would un-
derstand its rationale. It would seem like a tax on mother-
hood-and would seem so precisely because other forms of nonpe-
cuniary income are not taxed. There is also a potential liquidity
problem in requiring that tax be paid on nonpecuniary income
(more on this later).
An alternative to taxing housewives' imputed earnings would
be exempting working wives' income from income tax up to an
amount equal to some estimate of the average value of the earnings
from housework. But there would still be a problem of measure-
ment. And the exemption would operate as a subsidy to marriage
and thereby distort the choice of women whether (or when) to
marry. The most feasible approach might be to allow an income-
tax deduction for the costs of household help, on the
ground-which is entirely realistic-that these costs actually are
business expenses. Notice, however, that this approach might have
distributive effects somewhat similar to those of a housewives' tax,
because by lowering the tax revenues collected from working
women the deduction would require an increase in the income tax
rate, causing in turn an increase (with no offsetting deduction) in
the tax burden borne by households with a housewife.
Whatever the solution, the distortion caused by the failure to
I ignore the complications arising from the fact that many women who work full time
also do considerable housework.
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tax housewives' real (though nonpecuniary) earnings is an impor-
tant question for research. Why then is it not a question in which
feminists are interested? Perhaps because economic analysis is
thought to cut against women's interests. Or perhaps because the
proposal of a tax on housewives' imputed earnings is thought to
imply increasing the tax burden on women-indeed to invite com-
parison to a proposal to tax slaves on the ground that they produce
real though nonpecuniary income. The comparison is superficial.
To isolate the effect of a tax reform designed to reduce the misallo-
cative effects of the existing system of taxation, the analyst must
assume that the overall tax burden is not to be increased; that any
new tax will be offset by a reduction in an existing tax. (I em-
ployed this assumption in discussing the distributive effect of an
income-tax deduction for the cost of household help.) Suppose a
housewives' tax would be offset by a reduction in the federal in-
come tax rate. Then taxes paid by working women and their hus-
bands would fall; so would taxes paid by the husbands of house-
wives. The effect on husbands' income is relevant even if we do not
care anything about men's welfare. Because much consumption
within the household is joint, each spouse benefits from the income
earned by the other, and an increase in husbands' income will
therefore benefit wives as well. For both reasons (the fall in the
taxes paid by working women and the fall in the taxes paid by
working husbands), there is no ground for supposing that a tax on
housewives' imputed income would increase the tax burden borne
by women. It would, however, eliminate tax incentives from the
decision whether to work within or outside the home. In doing so it
would have the incidental but relevant effect of making men more
comfortable with the idea of their wives' working outside the
home. But the most important point is that the economic or liber-
tarian perspective (these are not identical, of course, but they are
connected) shows that things are not always as they seem; legisla-
tion superficially inimical to women's interests may actually serve
those interests-and vice versa as we shall see. Feminists who are
not libertarians may not like the vocabulary, methods, and as-
sumptions of economics, but if they refuse to consider the eco-
nomic consequences of policies affecting women they may end up
hurting rather than helping women.
The concept of housewives' imputed earnings has implications
that go beyond taxation. One concerns the assessment of damages
in tort cases and turns out to be a clearly "pro-woman" implication
or corollary of the idea of a housewives' tax. If a housewife is dis-
abled, how should her lost "earnings" be evaluated? My analysis of
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a housewives' tax implies that a minimum estimate of a disabled
housewife's lost earnings is the wage she would have commanded
in the market (summed over the estimated period of disability and
then discounted to present value at the appropriate interest rate),
for if those earnings were less, she would switch from household to
market employment. This method of estimation would probably
yield higher estimates than the "replacement cost" method, which
is the one most courts use at present and is flawed by the tendency
to ignore the quality dimension of the housewife's services.' I add
that the analysis of housework applies to work done by men as well
as by housewives; but most housework, when housework is defined
to include child care, is done by housewives.
Where the libertarian is apt to part company with the liberal
or radical feminist in the field of employment is over the question
whether employers should be forced to subsidize female employees,
as by being compelled to offer maternity leave or pregnancy bene-
fits, or to disregard women's greater longevity than men when fix-
ing pension benefits.7 To the extent that women workers incur
higher medical expenses than men (mainly but not entirely due to
pregnancy), or live longer in retirement on a company pension,
they cost the employer more than male workers do. So the em-
ployer should not be required to pay the same wage and provide
the same package of fringe benefits. (Of course, to the extent that
women impose lower costs-for example, women appear to be
more careful about safety than men, and therefore less likely to be
injured on the job-they are entitled to a correspondingly higher
wage or more extensive fringe benefits.) This is not to sug-
gest-which would be absurd-that women are blameworthy for
getting pregnant or for living longer than men. It is to suggest
merely that they may be more costly workers and that, if so, the
disparity in cost should be reflected in their net compensation.8 If
' For discussions of the various methods see Comment, Tort Damages for the Injured
Homemaker: Opportunity Cost or Replacement Cost?, 50 U Colo L Rev 59 (1978); Robert
P. Wolf, Assessing the Value of Householder Services: Three Methods, 22 Trial 81 (Oct
1986).
To a significant extent, the law now requires such subsidies. See Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978, 42 USC § 2000e(k) (1978); Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v Man-
hart, 435 US 702"(1978); Arizona Governing Committee v Norris, 463 US 1073 (1983). On
the possible social costs see Samuel A. Rea, Jr., The Market Response to the Elimination of
Sex-Based Annuities, 54 Social Econ J 55 (1987).
' Women may, of course, be better as well as more costly workers; then their net com-
pensation might be as high as or higher than men's. Presumably, though, the fringe-benefit
package would be different. The additional pension costs of women under a "unisex" system
are, by the way, substantial, as shown in Robert L. Moore, Are Male/Female Earnings Dif-
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this disparity is not reflected, then male workers are being discrim-
inated against in the same sense in which women would be dis-
criminated against if they received a lower wage than equally pro-
ductive (and no less costly) male workers. What is sauce for the
goose should be sauce for the gander. More than symmetry is in-
volved; we shall see in a moment that laws designed to improve the
welfare of women may boomerang, partly though not wholly be-
cause of the economic interdependence of men and women.
I anticipate three objections to my analysis. The first is that in
speaking of employers subsidizing women I am taking as an arbi-
trary benchmark the costs and performance of male workers. I am
not. Consider an employer who is female in a hypothetical female-
dominated society and whose entire labor force is also female, so
that for her the benchmark in setting terms of employment is fe-
male. A man applies for a job. He asks for a higher wage on the
ground that experience shows that the average male employee's
medical costs are lower than the average female employee's medi-
cal costs. If the employer refuses to pay him the higher wage, then,
assuming that this worker is just as good as the employer's average
female worker, the employer is discriminating against him. This
should answer the second objection-that nature should not be al-
lowed to determine social outcomes. I agree that natural law does
not compel the conclusion that women should be penalized in the
marketplace or anywhere else for living longer or for incurring
greater medical costs on average than men. But neither is there
any reason why men should be penalized for not living as long as
women by being forced to pay for women's longer years of retire-
ment. The matter should be left to the market.
The third objection to my analysis is that, in suggesting that
the employer be allowed to make cost-justified differentiations
based on sex, I am necessarily implying that he should be permit-
ted to treat employees as members of groups whose average char-
acteristics the particular employee may not share, rather than as
individuals. That is true. Some women die before some men, just
as some women are taller than some men. The difference is that
while it is obvious on inspection whether a given woman is taller
than a given man-and therefore it would be absurd for an em-
ferentials Related to Life-Expectancy-Caused Pension Cost Differences?, 25 Econ Inquiry
389 (1987). I ignore the complication that would be introduced if it were assumed that there
was a national policy of promoting childbirth. The question would then be whether requir-
ing employers to subsidize pregnant employees was an appropriate (efficient, equitable)
method of subsidization.
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ployer to implement a (let us assume valid) minimum-height re-
quirement of 5 feet 8 inches by refusing to accept job applications
from women, it is not obvious which women employees will not live
as long as which men employees or will not take as much leave or
incur as high medical expenses. Any cost-based differentiation in
these areas must be based on probabilistic considerations, of which
sex may be the most powerful in the sense of having the greatest
predictive power. The average differences between men and women
are not invidious, and many cut in favor of women-they are safer
drivers, and they live longer, and in a free insurance market would
therefore be able to buy liability insurance and life insurance at
lower rates than men. Women would not be stigmatized if the mar-
ket were allowed to register these differences.
It is not even clear, moreover, that women benefit, on balance,
from laws that forbid employers to take into account the extra
costs that female employees can impose. Such laws discourage em-
ployers from hiring, promoting, and retaining women, and there
are many ways in which they can discriminate in these respects
without committing detectable violations of the employment-dis-
crimination laws.9 Sometimes there is no question of violation, as
when an employer accelerates the substitution of computers for
secretaries in response to an increase in the costs of his female
employees.
There is an additional point. Most women are married-and
many who are not currently married are divorced or widowed and
continue to derive a benefit from their husband's earnings. The
consumption of a married woman is, as I have noted, a function of
her husband's income as well as of her own (in the divorce and
widowhood cases as well, for the reason just noted). Therefore a
reduction in men's incomes as a result of laws that interfere with
profit-maximizing and cost-minimizing decisions by employers will
' Suits for employment discrimination are not a terribly effective remedy. They are
rarely worth bringing even when the prospects for winning are good, because, in general, the
successful plaintiff can obtain only back pay and reinstatement, not common law damages,
and because the filing of an employment discrimination suit identifies the plaintiff as a
"trouble-maker," thereby making him or her unattractive to future employers. (Many
women, I have been told, regard filing a sex-discrimination suit as tantamount to commit-
ting professional suicide.) In addition, most discrimination cases are difficult to win, because
the plaintiff, unless irrationally willing to invest resources in investigation and proof that are
disproportionate to the modest stakes in most such cases, will be hard-pressed to establish
the counterfactual proposition essential to victory: for example, that she would not have
been fired if she had been male. I am speaking here primarily of disparate-treatment (inten-
tional discrimination) rather than disparate-impact litigation, but the latter will not elimi-
nate most forms of sex discrimination.
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reduce women's welfare as well as men's. Moreover, women who
are not married are less likely to have children than women who
are married; and where employer benefits are child-related-such
as pregnancy benefits and maternity leave-their effect is not
merely to transfer wealth from men to women but from women to
women. The effect could be dramatic. Compare the situation of a
married woman with many children and an unmarried woman with
no children. Generous pregnancy benefits and a generous policy on
maternity leave will raise the economic welfare of the married wo-
man. Her and her husband's wages will be lower, because all wages
will fall in order to finance the benefit, but the reduction will prob-
ably be smaller than the benefits to her-in part because the un-
married female worker will experience the same reduction in wages
but with no offsetting benefit. Feminists who support rules requir-
ing employers to grant pregnancy benefits and maternity leave
may therefore, and I assume unknowingly, be discouraging women
from remaining single or childless. Feminists of all persuasions
would think it outrageous if the government required fertile
women to have children, yet many feminists support an oblique
form of such a policy-a subsidy to motherhood. They do this, I
suspect, because they have not considered the economic conse-
quences of proposals that appear to help women.
The principle of equal pay for equal work makes perfectly
good economic sense, ' ° provided that equal work is understood,
10 This is not to say that a law requiring such equality on the part of private employers
(an important qualification, as will shortly become apparent) makes perfectly good economic
sense. Such laws are costly to administer, can backfire, and are of dubious efficacy. It might
make more sense to allow market forces, which penalize irrational discrimination (see Gary
S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination ch 2 (The University of Chicago Press, 2d ed
1971); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law ch 27 (Little, Brown and Co, 3d ed
1986)), to take care of irrational discrimination against women in employment, such as dis-
crimination based on an erroneous assessment of the costs and qualities of women as work-
ers or on a refusal (perhaps motivated by hostility to women) to act on a correct assessment.
I am not such a Pollyanna as to think that market forces will eliminate all discrimination
against women, but if they eliminate most of it, eliminating the rest may not be worth the
cost of the legal remedies.
A difficult case is sexual harassment in the workplace. Although market forces militate
against such harassment, they may not be completely effective (for reasons I discuss in my
book Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 190-91 (Harvard University Press,
1988)); this is suggested by the fact that such harassment is found even in firms operating in
highly competitive markets. Yet it is not "efficient," merely because it has survival qualities.
It is a market abuse, like embezzlement or commercial bribery-or, for that matter, rape,
which sexual harassment resembles. So a law against sexual harassment, as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e (1964), has been interpreted to be, is consistent
with libertarian principles-more so, oddly enough, than the basic prohibition against dis-
crimination in hiring, firing, promotion and wages. Discrimination may in some cases serve
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consistently with the previous discussion, to mean equal in cost to
the employer as well as in benefit to the employer (productivity).
It does not follow, however, that women are bound to have the
same average wage rate as men even if there is no difference in
medical or other costs or those differences are offset by other fac-
tors. Whether, despite being just as "good" as men, women will
have the same average wage rate depends critically on whether
they are willing to make the same commitment to the labor force
as men do. A woman who takes several years out of the work force
to stay home with her young children cannot expect to have the
same average wage as a man who works continuously.11 Since her
expected working life is shorter, she will invest less in her human
capital (earning capacity); and part of a wage is a return to that
investment. 2
Feminists who are not libertarians may retort that the propen-
sity of women rather than men to take leave from work to raise
their children is itself a subtle consequence of sex discrimination,
"sex role socialization," or related factors. 3 Whether it is nature or
culture that is responsible for the fact that on average male self-
esteem is more involved in career than female self-esteem is a pro-
foundly difficult question on which I can claim no expertise; but
certainly it would be rash to reject nature out of hand. It is possi-
ble that women are more devoted to children than men are and
the employer's interests and even be socially efficient. See Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law at 624; Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am Econ
Rev 659 (1972). Sexual harassment is much less likely to have any redeeming social value.
See Posner, Law and Literature at 190-91.
11 If, however, women's greater longevity results in their retiring later than men, their
total working life may be the same as, or even longer than, that of men.
12 See Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J
Labor Econ S33, S52-S54 (1985). And indeed much of the difference in average hourly
wages between men and women appears to reflect differences in investment in human capi-
tal. See Jacob Mincer and Haim Ofek, Interrupted Work Careers: Depreciation and Resto-
ration of Human Capital, 17 J Human Resources 3 (1982); Jacob Mincer and Solomon
Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women, 82 J Pol Econ S76
(1974); Mary Corcoran and Greg J. Duncan, Work History, Labor Force Attachment, and
Earnings Differences Between the Races and Sexes, 14 J Human Resources 3 (1979). But
how much? Estimates range from 39 to 45 percent. See Francine D. Blau and Marianne A.
Ferber, Occupations and Earnings of Women Workers, in Karen Shallcross Koziara,
Michael H. Moskow, and Lucretia Dewey Tanner, eds, Working Women: Past, Present, Fu-
ture 37, 57 (BNA, 1987). How much of the unexplained variance is due to discrimination is
of course unknown. The variance itself, though large, appears to be declining; the decline
has been masked by the very influx of women into the workforce, since new workers tend to
receive low wages. See June O'Neill, The Trend in the Male-Female Wage Gap in the
United States, 3 J Labor Econ S91 (1985).
" See, for example, Mary E. Corcoran and Paul N. Courant, Sex. Role Socialization
and Labor Market Outcomes, 75 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proc 275 (May 1985).
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more talented at child rearing and that these differences reflect a
genuine comparative advantage possessed by women as a result of
millions of years of evolution, rather than just "brainwashing" by
men and male-dominated women.1' The human infant requires
prolonged nurture, and there may well have been efficiency advan-
tages, under the exceedingly primitive conditions that obtained
throughout all but the most recent history of the human race, to a
sexual division of labor in which one spouse specializes in nurture
and the other in hunting and in protection from enemies. To an
unknown extent, that division may be "hard-wired" into our
brains.
Even if these speculations are correct, they are correct about
the average woman versus the average man rather than about
every woman and every man. Within each there is a distribution of
attitudes toward children. And the two distributions intersect.
Many women are less devoted to children and less skillful at rais-
ing children than many men. The point of intersection is undoubt-
edly influenced by cultural factors that are changeable, as well as
by biological factors that may be changeable if at all only at great
cost. But whether biological or cultural factors predominate in the
observed differences between the job commitments of men and
women may be peripheral to the questions of policy that are in-
volved in the debate over the male-female earnings gap. It is a mis-
take to suppose that biological differences are always more refrac-
tory than cultural ones. Genetic vision defects can be corrected by
glasses more easily than social customs can be changed by govern-
ment. But the point cuts in both directions. The fact-if it is a
fact-that the predominant role of women in child-rearing is cul-
turally contingent rather than biologically determined does not im-
ply that it can easily be changed by governmental intervention or
that we should greet governmental regulation of the family struc-
ture with open arms. The idea that government should try to alter
the decisions of married couples on how to allocate time to raising
children is a strange mixture of the Utopian and the repulsive. The
division of labor within marriage is something to be sorted out pri-
vately rather than made a subject of public intervention. Liberal
and radical feminists can if they want urge women to stay in the
labor force and have no children or fewer children, or persuade
their husbands to assume a greater role in child rearing. Others can
" See, for example, David P. Barash, Sociobiology and Behavior ch 6-7 (Elsevier,
1977). For a contrary view, see W. Penn Handwerker and Paul V. Crosbie, Sex and Domi-
nance, 84 Am Anthropologist 97 (1982).
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urge the contrary. The ultimate decision is best left to private
choice. (Parallel arguments can be made-and often are made by
feminists-against laws that forbid abortion or that subsidize mar-
riage and childbearing.)
This analysis argues against publicly financed day-care centers
for children of working women (other than those who are very
poor), beyond the obvious libertarian argument that if the families
of working mothers are willing and able to pay for day care, the
market will provide the service more efficiently than the govern-
ment-and if they are not willing, on what ground should taxpay-
ers be forced to pay for this service? A comprehensive public sys-
tem of day-care centers, on the Swedish model, would require a
substantial increase in taxation.' " This increase would significantly,
perhaps dramatically, reduce the disposable income of all house-
holds, but the crunch would be particularly severe in households
with a nonworking wife. 6 Although, as I have said, the work that
housewives do is valuable, it is not pecuniary, and a household
could encounter liquidity problems if one wage earner's income
had to bear the full brunt of taxation. So the day-care program
would drive women out of the home.'7 Besides the liquidity effect,
a taxpayer-supported day-care program would distort the woman's
choice between home and market by driving a wedge between the
social cost of day care and the private cost (zero, if the subsidy
paid the household's full cost of day care). Again we find feminists
supporting a form of public intervention that would interfere with
free choices by women. Admittedly, the distortion just noted might
offset the distortion noted earlier that is created by the failure to
tax housewives' real but nonpecuniary income from household pro-
duction. And the taxing of housewives' income, a project with plau-
" The American and Swedish systems of day care are compared in William M. Bridge-
land, Philip R. Smith and Edward A Duane, Child-Care Policy Arenas: A Comparison Be-
tween Sweden and the United States, 26 Intl J Sociology 35, 36-37 (1985). It has been
estimated that in the United States by 1995 two-thirds of preschool children and three-
fourths of school-age children will have working mothers. Sandra L. Hofferth and Deborah
A. Phillips, Child Care in the United States, 1970 to 1995, 49 J Marriage & Family 559, 561
(1987). For a skeptical view of the existence of a day-care "crisis" in the United States, see
Ron Haskins, What Day Care Crisis?, Regulation 13 (1988).
Why, by the way, should childless persons be taxed to pay for day care? Does day
care provide the external benefits that public education provides and that are widely be-
lieved to justify on strictly economic grounds some level, at least, of public subsidy for edu-
cation? Perhaps so. One possible argument is that day care is likely to be better for a child
than a low-quality mother and that low-quality mothers are more likely to use day care than
high-quality ones. If so, a public subsidy for day care might confer a net external benefit on
children. Plainly this is another important area for research.
," See Michael Levin, Feminism, Stage Three, 82 Commentary 27 (Aug 1986).
191]
202 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
sible economic support, would create the same liquidity problem as
taxation designed to support universal day care.
Another ambitious feminist proposal that is economically
questionable is "comparable worth,""8 at least when extended from
government employment (which may well embody departures from
competitive wage-setting that are due to sex discrimination since
government is subject to, at best, weak competitive constraints) to
the private sector. The idea behind comparable worth is that occu-
pations traditionally dominated by women, such as nursing, are
underpaid relative to occupations traditionally dominated by men,
such as driving a truck. The problem is that while it is relatively
easy to determine when men and women are being paid differently
for the same work-at least where they are performing standard-
ized chores in which productivity varies little among workers-it is
next to impossible to determine when the wage differential among
occupations is greater than is necessary to compensate for differ-
ences in skills, working conditions, etc. The best evidence is a
queue of workers seeking entry into higher-paid occupation and a
shortage of workers in the lower-paid occupation. But the very na-
ture of this evidence is also a clue to the self-correcting character
of "comparable worth" problems. If one occupation is overpaid rel-
ative to another, workers will flow from the second to the first,
causing wages to rise in the second and fall in the first until com-
parable worth is restored. Comparable worth is the equilibrium,
and disequilibrium is self-correcting provided there are not artifi-
cial barriers to entry. (This is a clue to why the argument for com-
parable worth is stronger when applied to public employment.) If
women are not excluded from higher-paid occupations or (what is
the same thing) confined to lower-paid occupations, a difference
that exceeds the equilibrium pay difference between occupations
that will draw them into the higher-paid occupation and compara-
ble worth will be achieved automatically, without any need for
public intervention beyond, perhaps, prohibitions against the ex-
clusion of women from occupations-and that is already prohibited
by Title VII.
All this may be too sunny and certainly is in tension with the
evidence that at least some of the male-female earnings gap is due
18 For discussion and references see Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 314 (cited in
note 10); Daniel R. Fischel and Edward P. Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discrimination
in Labor Markets, 53 U Chi L Rev 891 (1986); Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses
and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 Harv L Rev 1728 (1986).
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to discrimination, " although, as I said earlier, the gap is narrow-
ing. It might be better to attack the remaining discrimination di-
rectly, difficult though that is, rather than settle for a "separate
but equal" solution, as comparable worth has been described.2
The costs of achieving comparable worth in the private sector
could be considerable, since it will reduce the efficiency with which
labor is utilized; private employers, even those not entirely free
from discriminatory tendencies, will make more efficient employ-
ment decisions than, for example, the bureaucrats in the Depart-
ment of Labor. And comparable worth may not succeed in redis-
tributing wealth in favor of women. Its effect is to attract into the
''women's" fields both men who formerly worked in the "men's"
fields and the (few) women who worked there, resulting in more
workers-many of them men-bidding for fewer jobs (since em-
ployers will respond to a rise in the cost of labor by hiring fewer
workers). Women displaced from the now better paid "women's"
fields will compete with women in fields not covered by compara-
ble worth, resulting in lower wages for the women in those fields."1
And to the extent that men are hurt, the women married to those
men are hurt too, since, as noted earlier, to the extent that con-
sumption in the household is joint, each spouse benefits from the
other's income.
II. THE FAMILY AND SEX
The questions become even more difficult when we switch fo-
cus from employment to the family and sex, where such issues as
abortion, surrogate motherhood, rape (including "date rape" and
marital rape), incest, battered wives, divorce, and pornography fill
the horizon. The libertarian perspective provides a unified, though
in some places a highly controversial and in other places an inde-
terminate, approach to these issues. From that perspective the fo-
" See note 12. And see William T. Bielby and James N. Baron, Sex Segregation
Within Occupations, 76 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proc 43 (May 1986), for evidence that some
employers do steer men and women into different job classifications.
"0 See Daphne Greenwood, The Institutional Inadequacy of the Market in Determin-
ing Comparable Worth: Implications for Value Theory, 18 J Econ Issues 457, 463 (1984).
See Robert S. Smith, Comparable Worth: Limited Coverage and the Exacerbation of
Inequality, 41 Industrial & Labor Rel Rev 227 (1988). Within the public sector, where wages
often are not determined in accordance with competitive forces in labor markets, compara-
ble worth may be a sounder policy. For some evidence see Elaine Sorensen, Implementing
Comparable Worth: A Survey of Recent Job Evaluation Studies, 76 Am Econ Rev Papers
& Proc 364 (May 1986).
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cus is, once again, on freedom of contract.2 2 People should be able
to cut their own deals, in matters of sex and the family as well as
in more conventionally economic arenas, subject to a duty not to
impose uncompensated costs on third parties.23 When transaction
costs are high, the law should try to impose the deal that the par-
ties would have struck if negotiation had been feasible.
This approach works well with such issues as divorce and sur-
rogate motherhood, less well with rape, incest, and pornography,
and poorly with abortion. When marriage is viewed as a contract,
divorce becomes the name for contract termination, and the ques-
tion becomes one of the proper remedy.24 The closest analogy to
marriage in the sphere of contracts is partnership, and the rule in
partnership law is that upon dissolution each partner takes back
the assets that he had contributed to the partnership. Until re-
cently, the law had failed to value the wife's contributions ade-
quately. For example, in the common case when the wife had put
her husband through medical school or law school, the courts
failed to recognize that she was part owner of the degree her hus-
band had obtained and of the earning power conferred by that de-
gree, and thus tended to award less alimony (which in this analysis
is installment "repatriation" of the wife's share of the nonliquid
assets of the marriage) than was economically efficient. This ineq-
" And here it is timely to remember that until this century the limitations on the con-
tractual rights of married women, and on the right of divorce, were so substantial that it was
possible for a sober observer to state: "The law of the status of women is the last vestige of
slavery." Nicholas St. John Green, Married Women, in his Essays and Notes on the Law of
Tort and Crime 31, 48 (George Banta, 1933) (first published in 1871). Yet as is now widely
recognized, "no fault" divorce is not the answer. More men than women desire divorces.
Therefore, allowing either spouse to divorce at will deprives married women of substantial
bargaining power: Since their consent to granting their husband a divorce is no longer re-
quired, they can't condition that consent on the husband's agreeing to pay reasonable ali-
mony and child support. "The major economic result of the divorce law revolution is the
systematic impoverishment of divorced women and their children." Lenore J. Weitzman,
The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women
and Children in America xiv (The Free Press, 1985). This finding is a warning to feminists
about the unintended consequences of public policies.
1' There could be external benefits from a higher population (national defense, larger
markets permitting more effective exploitation of economies of scale, to name a few), and
these might justify subsidies for childbirth. I ignore this possibility; it seems remote from
the present condition of the United States, with its huge population, its serious problems of
congestion and pollution, and its heavy immigration both legal and illegal.
2 On the economics of marriage and divorce see, for example, Gary S. Becker, A Trea-
tise on the Family (Harvard University Press, 1981); Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of
Alimony, 7 J Legal Stud 35 (1978); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, "I
Gave Him the Best Years of My Life", 16 J Legal Stud 267 (1987); Posner, Economic Anal-
ysis of Law ch 3 (cited in note 10).
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uity is gradually being corrected."6
Surrogate motherhood2 6 is, from the woman's standpoint, the
nine-month rental of her reproductive capacity to another family.
Why there is a movement afoot-supported by many though not
all feminists 7 -to forbid women to obtain a monetary return on
this valuable, uniquely female asset puzzles me. The movement is
paternalistic (pun intended), indeed patronizing, because it denies
the capacity of the surrogates to make advantageous contracts. It
treats women as children, men (the father) as wily, deceitful, and
manipulative; it reinforces the stereotype of women as being domi-
nated by emotion rather than reason; and it reminds us of the time
when married women were not legally competent to make con-
tracts. The surrogates (even those-who are, I believe, the major-
ity-who have borne children before) are not credited with suffi-
cient foresight or emotional maturity to charge a price that will
compensate them not only for the risk and expense of the preg-
nancy but for the emotional wrench experienced at giving up the
newborn baby. There are, of course, women who lack the requisite
foresight and emotional maturity, just as there are men who lack
the requisite foresight and emotional maturity to make rational de-
cisions to engage in such characteristically male voluntary activi-
ties as high-stakes gambling, illegal trafficking in drugs, military
combat, and dangerous sports. The saga of "Baby M"' has dis-
torted public and professional thinking on surrogate motherhood.
One is not surprised that some surrogate mothers experience deep
regret when it comes time to surrender the newly born baby; but a
sensible decision on whether to forbid contracts of surrogate moth-
erhood-that is, whether to deem adult women incompetent to
enter into binding contracts of a particular type-requires consid-
eration not only of these women but also of the surrogates who
complete the performance of their contractual undertaking without
incident, of the father and adoptive mother, and of the children.
As far as I am able to discover, 9 the vast majority of surrogates are
2" See, for example, O'Brien v O' Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 489 NE2d 712 (1985) (treating
husband's medical license as marital property); Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of
Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40 Ark L Rev 439 (1987).
" I find "surrogate motherhood" a rather misleading name for the rental of a woman's
reproductive capacity.
27 For a feminist defense of surrogate motherhood, see Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate
Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 Law, Medicine & Health Care 72 (1988).
28 See Matter of Baby M, 109 NJ 396, 537 A2d 1227 (1988).
29 See my article, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood, 5 J Contemp Health L & Policy 21, 25 (1989).
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satisfied with the arrangement, as are, of course, the fathers and
the adoptive mothers. It is too soon to tell whether surrogate
motherhood will harm the children, but the likelihood seems small.
The only practical difference between surrogate motherhood and
adoption is that the price is somewhat higher under the former
arrangement-$10,000 on average versus about $3,000 (some adop-
tion agencies, however, charge as much as $15,000)-although the
comparison is somewhat academic since very few healthy white in-
fants are available from adoption agencies any more, and, whether
rightly or wrongly, those are the children that most people want to
adopt. How the price difference might cause psychological injury to
the surrogate children is beyond me.
I might react differently if persuaded that many surrogate
mothers are desperate women, driven by extreme poverty to en-
gage in a form of sale that causes them deep emotional distress. I
might say in such a case that society should do something to re-
lieve their poverty and desperation beyond merely permitting
them to sell their only marketable asset. But I have not seen the
evidence that would persuade me of this-and I have been looking
for it.
It might seem that from the surrogate mother's standpoint,
the best of all possible worlds would be a rule that permitted her
to take money in exchange for agreeing to bear a child for another
couple but entitled her to change her mind, when the baby was
born, about giving it up. But the price she would receive for the
rental of her reproductive capacity would be lower under such a
regime. The couple would be getting considerably less for their
money, since if the surrogate mother decided to keep the child
they would have lost many months in their quest for a child. A
final consideration is that if contracts of surrogate motherhood are
forbidden, married men who are desperately eager for a child may
decide to abandon their wives.
Rape and pornography present easier issues in principle than
in practice. Rape parallels theft in being a coerced taking in a set-
ting of low transaction costs. Persons who want sex (violent or oth-
erwise) should be required to "bargain" for it. This is not to say
that sex is characteristically commercial or that legalizing prostitu-
tion is the answer to the problem of rape. It is to say that personal
relationships, like commercial ones, can be presumed to be welfare-
enhancing only when they are consensual, involving commitments
(implicit or explicit) of mutual pleasure, emotional support, mar-
riage, children, etc. Just as someone who covets my compact-disc
player should be required to bargain for it with me rather than
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allowed to purloin it, so men should not be permitted to impose
themselves on unwilling women. The difficult problem in rape, as
in incest, child abuse, and wife-battering, is that criminal activity
which occurs in private, and which may leave few or no physical
traces, poses difficult evidentiary problems for courts.
Pornography parallels pollution in being the result of a volun-
tary activity (the sale" of pornography to the consumers of pornog-
raphy, the sale of the factory's product to the consumers of that
product) that may have uncompensated third-party effects, such as
inciting its consumers to rape. The rape and pornography exam-
ples are convergent for those who believe that pornography encour-
ages its consumers to commit rape by teaching that women enjoy
forcible subordination to men.
The practical problems arise from the evidentiary difficulties
that I have just alluded to that complicate rape cases (mainly but
not limited to difficulties connected with the defense of consent),
uncertainty about the existence or magnitude of the effects of por-
nography on third parties (pornography may have little or no ef- ,
fect on the incidence of sex crimes-may be, indeed, at least for
some consumers of pornography, a substitute for rape), and diffi-
culty in distinguishing pornography from socially valuable forms of
expression concerning sex. About these problems I have nothing
new to say,30 but I do want to comment on the suggestion that
using misrepresentation to obtain consent to sexual intercourse
should be declared a form of rape, though perhaps punished less
seriously than forcible rape." The evidentiary problems would be
serious, but I am interested in another point: the implicit modeling
of sexual relations on the economic market. Obtaining money by
fraud or false pretenses is a crime; thus, the suggestion goes, ob-
taining sex by fraud or false pretenses should also be a crime.
Many feminists are hostile to capitalism in general and to prostitu-
tion in particular. They may not realize that to imply that the
criminal law of fraud provides an appropriate model for the law of
rape is to embrace the economic model of social interaction in a
particularly uncompromising form.
I now turn to an issue about which the libertarian has, I be-
lieve, nothing to say except that the issue resists fruitful analysis
in libertarian or economic analysis. That is the issue of abortion.
At first glance there might appear to be a simple libertarian solu-
" I discuss the feminist challenge to pornography briefly in Posner, Law and Litera-
ture at 334-37 (cited in note 10).
See Susan Estrich, Real Rape 103 (Harvard University Press, 1987).
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tion: The mother should be entitled to abort the fetus at any stage
of pregnancy and for whatever reason, provided she is willing to
pay the cost of the abortion. The only condition would be that she
must get the father's permission if, but only if, the implicit or ex-
plicit contract between her and the father made the fetus a joint
"asset" of its parents rather than the mother's asset only. Assum-
ing either that the father does consent or that he is not required to
consent because he has no contractual interest in the fetus, abor-
tion would appear to be a voluntary transaction with no third-
party effects. But this analysis ignores the effect on the fetus itself.
If the fetus is deemed a member of society, with the consequence
that its welfare counts in the social calculus along with that of the
mother and father, then it is not obvious that abortion is value-
maximizing on the average, unless perhaps the fetus has some ter-
rible deformity that might permit us to say with some confidence
that if it could be consulted in the matter it would say that it
would rather not be born-in other words, unless the fetus would
incur a net disutility, both expected and realized, from living. Of
course, even a healthy fetus might "prefer" to be born to more ma-
ture parents (abortion when used as a device for family planning
affects the timing but not necessarily the number of children that
a woman has); but it would be a different fetus that would be born
later.
The decision whom to count as a member of society (foreign-
ers? animals?) for purposes of determining whether his or her or
its welfare shall count in the design of social institutions is a moral
question about which libertarians (in the sense in which I am using
the word) and economists have nothing to say. Nor is the status of
the fetus the only moral issue; so is the freedom of the woman who
finds herself involuntarily or accidentally pregnant. The libertarian
can point out that regardless of how the moral issues are resolved,
laws forbidding abortion are unlikely to be any more effective than
other laws penalizing victimless crimes (the fetus is not an articu-
late victim and its family can't be counted on to bring its "killers"
to justice). 32 And abortion laws are undoubtedly a severe curtail-
ment of women's liberty, and one having no counterpart in laws
affecting men. But as the moral issue both depends critically on
the status to be assigned the fetus and is central to the controversy
over abortion, economic or libertarian analysis will not resolve the
32 For an attempt to estimate the effect of prohibiting abortion on the incidence of
abortions, see Marshall H. Medoff, An Economic Analysis of the Demand for Abortions, 26
Econ Inquiry 353 (1988).
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controversy.
III. Do WOMEN AND MEN THINK DIFFERENTLY ABOUT LAW?
The discerning reader will have noticed in the discussion up to
now three stages of feminist thought. In the first, which corre-
sponds to the first stage in the civil rights movement, women seek
simply to be relieved from legal disabilities that limit their range
of choice compared to that of men. (Abortion is a complicated in-
stance of the simple point.) In the second stage, which corresponds
to the second, "affirmative action" stage in the civil rights move-
ment-the stage this movement is now in-women seek affirmative
benefits in order to remove a residue of past discrimination. Com-
parable worth is best understood in this light. In both stages it is
assumed that women are identical to men in every respect to which
public policy might be relevant. In the third stage, which has no
counterpart in the civil rights movement, women are admitted to
be different (on average) from men in certain policy-relevant re-
spects such as longevity and pregnancy but it is argued that these
differences should not be allowed to influence employers; nature
should not dictate, or even justify, social outcomes. Desexed annu-
ity tables, subsidized day care, and compulsory disability benefits
for pregnancy are all products of this third stage.33 But while con-
ceding physical differences between men and women, third-stage
feminists do not argue (and indeed would be inclined to deny) that
women think differently from men. Such an argument would un-
dermine their position. It is one thing to say that differences be-
tween the male and female reproductive systems, or differences in
physical strength or longevity, or the different roles of men and
women in nurturing infants-all differences that we share with
other primates-should not affect marketplace compensation, and
quite another to say that women and men should receive the same
compensation even if there are profound and permanent mental
and psychological differences between the sexes. Yet fourth-stage
feminists, heavily represented in contemporary feminist jurispru-
dence, appear to claim precisely this. 4
13 Subsidized day care is actually an ambiguous case, for it is sometimes justified on the
ground that, but for the legacy of discrimination against women, men would play a greater
role in child-rearing than they do, thus freeing women to work outside the home without
having to buy day care.
" For illustrations, see Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and
Tort, 38 J Legal Educ 3 (1988); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progres-
sive Income Tax Movement, 86 Mich L Rev 465 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and
the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va L Rev 543 (1986); Robin West,
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. I first became aware of this claim two years ago, while teaching
a course on Law and Literature. I had noticed that in a number of
works of literature, including Antigone, Euripides' Hecuba, The
Merchant of Venice, Measure for Measure, and Susan Glaspell's A
Jury of Her Peers, a woman is seen appealing to natural law
against a male embodiment of legal positivism. 5 These works
could be read to imply that there is a distinctively masculine out-
look on law, an outlook that revels in legalisms, technicalities,
rules, strict construction, "hard cases' 'I-a formalistic outlook,
one might call it-and an equally distinctive feminine outlook that
emphasizes equity, broad standards, substantial justice, discretion.
The masculine outlook abstracts from the rich particulars of a dis-
pute a few salient facts and makes them dispositive; that is law as
rules. The feminine outlook prefers to base judgment on the total
circumstances of the case, unhampered by rules that require a
blinkered vision, untroubled by the need to conform decision to
general, "neutral" principles.
I asked the students in my class whether they thought there
was any validity to such "gendering" of these opposed visions of
law. I expected the women in the class to deny that there was. One
of the oldest stereotypes about the sexes is that men are good at
abstract thought (and hence good at logic, mathematics, and phys-
ics) and at containing or repressing their emotions, while women
are good at concrete thought and are intuitive and emotional (and
hence good at writing novels); and that women but not men shrink
from making hard decisions-that is, decisions that hurt yet may
nonetheless be justified and even compelled. To my surprise, two-
thirds of the women in the class responded that law as it is taught
in law schools (which is to say, with a pronounced "formalist" bias)
is more congenial to the male way of thinking than the female.
This response illustrates what I am calling the fourth stage of fem-
inist jurisprudence.
This stage owes much to the work of Carol Gilligan, a psychol-
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U Chi L Rev 1 (1988).
31 See Posner, Law and Literature at 108-13 (cited in note 10); see also Paul Gewirtz,
Aeschylus' Law, 101 Harv L Rev 1043 (1988). Another illustration, this one from Billy
Budd, is Captain Vere's telling the court-martial (in the course of his making a highly for-
malistic argument for the condemnation of Billy) to disregard "the feminine in man." Harri-
son Hayford and Merton M. Sealts, Jr., eds, Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor (An In-
side Narrative) 111 (University of Chicago Press, 1962).
30 1 use this term in its original sense of cases that tug at the heartstrings, and are
therefore thought likely to make "hard law." The implication is that the good judge will
resist the pull.
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ogist who in an influential book"7 distinguished between an "ethic
of rights" that she regarded as distinctively masculine and an
"ethic of care" that she regarded as distinctively feminine. Her
principal evidence for this sex-related difference was the different
attitudes of boys and of girls toward "enforcing" the rules of chil-
dren's games-boys being quick (she found) to "adjudicate" al-
leged violations and condemn the violator, girls tending to aban-
don the game when an infraction was charged, for fear that an
attempt to determine the rights and wrongs of the parties would
result in hurt feelings; boys tending to judge infractions according
to hard and fast rules, girls tending to evaluate the alleged infrac-
tion in its full human context. Gilligan does not speculate on
whether this difference in behaviors (which she finds not only in
games, but in the responses of boys and girls to hypothetical moral
issues) is due to biology or to upbringing, and if the latter whether
it may not be an indirect result of discrimination against women.
She does make clear that, whatever its cause, the ethic of care is
valuable; it is not something that women should be ashamed of or
should regard as a negative legacy of oppression, to be cast off as
soon as possible.
The ethic of rights sketched by Gilligan corresponds rather
closely to the formalistic style of law, and the ethic of care to the
more contextual, personal, and discretionary style. Maybe it's true
that women tend to prefer a less formalistic style of law than men.
Although in twenty years of teaching law to students of both sexes
and seven years of being a judge assisted by law clerks of both
sexes I have not noticed any such difference, this may be due to
the self-selection of female students who apply to elite law schools,
to the socialization that they undergo in law school, or to my own
lack of sensitivity. If there is such a difference, we can expect that
as women come to play a larger and larger role in the legal profes-
sion and the judiciary, the character of our law will change; we will
see fewer rules and more standards, less talk about logic and more
"7 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Develop-
ment (Harvard University Press, 1982). In a similar vein see Mary Field Belenky, et al,
Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voices, and Mind ch 6 (Basic Books,
1986). Gilligan's findings have been questioned. See William J. Friedman, Amy B. Robinson,
and Britt L. Friedman, Sex Differences in Moral Judgments? A Test of Gilligan's Theory,
11 Psych of Women Q 37 (1987), and references cited therein. Empirical support for Gilli-
gan's theory is presented in Maureen Rose Ford and Carol Rotter Lowery, Gender Differ-
ences in Moral Reasoning: A Comparison of the Use of Justice and Care Orientations, 50 J
Personality & Soc Psych 777 (1986); Mary K. Rothbart, Dean Hanley and Marc Albert,
Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning, 15 Sex Roles 645 (1986).
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about practical reason, and less anxiety about maintaining law's
determinacy, objectivity, and impersonality.
I myself, male though I am, would welcome such a change; for
although women may on average be less formalistic than men (I
am skeptical that this is so, but it is possible), there are many men
who dislike formalism and I am one of them." I consider formal-
ism unworkable if not hypocritical; and I think the traditional at-
tempt to link classical liberalism to a rule-bound jurisprudence, an
attempt visible in such modern libertarians as James Buchanan
and Friedrich Hayek, is doomed to failure. It is true that, if pushed
too far, a personalistic, contextualist, in short "realistic" (in the
legal-realist sense) conception of law would bring us face to face
with the anarchy of "popular justice," symbolized by the trial and
condemnation of Socrates by a lay jury of hundreds with no delib-
erations, no professional judges, and no right of appeal; and by the
kangaroo courts of totalitarian regimes, well illustrated by the
"people's courts" of Mao's China. But at its formalist extreme law
is monstrous, inhuman, socially irrelevant, and thoroughly bogus.
Both extremes are to be avoided; to equate the formalist extreme
with classical liberalism is a canard on liberalism. Law properly is
a mixture of rules and discretion, law and equity, rule and stan-
dard, positive laws and ethical principles (corresponding to natural
law), logic and practical reason, lay judges and professional judges,
objectivity and subjectivity. And the "feminine" pole should be the
last thing that any member of an oppressed group-if that is how
the modern American woman should be described-wants to see
dominate legal thought: As Shylock rightly feared, in arguing for a
literal interpretation of his bond with Antonio, discretion in a legal
system is apt to be exercised against the pariah.39 It is hard to say
whether women would be on balance better or worse off if the legal
system were more empathetic than it is, but it does not appear
that women fare particularly well under the discretionary system
of qadi justice in traditional Moslem law.
In this connection it should be noted that the men who reject
formalism are not feminist jurisprudes in any useful sense. They
" See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform
(Harvard University Press, 1985); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86
Mich L Rev 827 (1988). I am using "formalism" in the rather loose sense of "rule-bound or
legalistic"; in its alternative sense of "logical reasoning in cases where such reasoning is
possible and pertinent," I of course have no criticism.
"9 This point has been made recently by minority legal scholars in criticism of the anti-
rights rhetoric of the critical legal studies movement. See Symposium, Minority Critiques of
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 Harv CR-CL L Rev 297 (1987).
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are (in the Anglo-American sphere) legal realists, or pragmatists,
or instrumentalists, or skeptics-which is to say that they possess
outlooks on law that long predate the entry of women in significant
numbers into positions of influence in the legal profession. I ques-
tion whether there is a distinctively feminine outlook on law, as
distinct from an outlook that men and women share, though per-
haps in different proportions.
I therefore disagree with Suzanna Sherry's argument that "a
feminine jurisprudence, evident, for example, in the decisions of
Justice O'Connor, might thus be quite unlike any other contempo-
rary jurisprudence."40 What Sherry actually finds in her examina-
tion of Justice O'Connor's opinions are a dislike of "bright line"
rules and a sensitivity to community interests (this is how Sherry
explains the fact that O'Connor is a "law and order" conservative
in criminal cases). Sherry would have found the same things if she
had read the opinions of Justice Tom Clark or any number of
other conservative jurists.
I have the same reaction to the suggestion by Frank
Michelman, made in the course of a minute examination of one
opinion of Justice O'Connor's, that her use in that case of a "bal-
ancing test" may reflect a distinctively feminine outlook."1 Many is
the male jurist who has been drawn to balancing tests; indeed,
such attraction is one of the defining characteristics of the prag-
matic, instrumental, or "realist" style of judging. I challenge
Sherry and Michelman to pick out Justice O'Connor's opinions in
a blindfold test; I find nothing distinctively feminine in the style or
content of her opinions.
Leslie Bender suggests that a feminist tort law would replace
the "reasonable man" with the "caring neighbor.' 2 This sugges-
tion misunderstands the significance of the "reasonable man" (or,
as it is now more often and more appropriately referred to, the
"reasonable person") rule in tort law. Its significance lies in
preventing tortfeasors (or victims of torts) from arguing that while
the average person could have avoided the accident, the actual
party in the case could not have done so, because he had a below-
average capacity to take care. I do not understand Bender to be
quarreling with this result. Her point rather is that in deciding
how much care is optimal, we should suppose that potential injur-
40 Sherry, 72 Va L Rev at 543 (cited in note 34).
See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 Harv L Rev 4, 17 n 68, 32-36 (1986).
" See Bender, 38 J Legal Educ at 30-32 (cited in note 34).
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ers are not completely strangers to their potential victims but are
mildly altruistic toward them (a caring neighbor is more altruistic
than a stranger but less so than a close relative). However, people
are what they are; most neighbors are not caring, and most acci-
dent victims are not neighbors. Human nature will not be altered
by holding injurers liable for having failed to take the care that a
caring neighbor would have taken. The only effect of adopting
Bender's proposal would be to shift negligence liability in the di-
rection of strict liability."3 Her "caring neighbor" is an unnecessary
step in the analysis. Bender might as well argue directly for strict
liability on the ground that it is the more altruistic regime than
negligence.
Is it? Strict liability is sometimes defended on the ground that
it provides more compensation to more accident victims. This is a
partial analysis. Strict liability can also result in higher prices, and
the burden may be borne by consumers. The net distributive im-
pact is unclear. If these complications are ignored, maybe a femi-
nine outlook on law could be expected to stress compensa-
tion-obviously Bender associates altruism with women. On the
other hand, strict liability is more rule-like, less standard-like, less
contextualist, less sensitive to the particulars of the individual ac-
cident, than negligence is; in that respect it is the more masculine
standard. Maybe Gilligan's ethic of care cannot be made the basis
for a coherent feminist jurisprudence. And if it can be, the result
may not be anything distinct from old-fashioned American legal
realism," provided we understand that altruism is a feature of
some but not all versions of legal realism. Both Holmes and Car-
dozo were realists, but only Cardozo was a liberal (in the modern,
not classical, sense). Plenty of male jurists have worn their hearts
on their sleeves.
A recent article by Robin West articulates a slightly different
43 To illustrate, suppose an accident having expected cost of $100 could be prevented
only by an expenditure of $110 on care. Then the failure to prevent the accident would not
be negligent, and under normal principles of tort liability the injurer would not be liable to
his victim. But presumably a caring neighbor would go the extra step to prevent the acci-
dent (at least if the victim was not fully insured against its consequences), so under
Bender's proposal the injurer would be liable if he failed to prevent the accident. But liabil-
ity would not (except in special circumstances) induce him to take the extra care, which by
definition would cost more than the expected accident; he would rather pay the occasional
judgment. Liability in such a case would just make negligence liability strict liability.
" Except that the legal realists were for the most part not interested in sexual bias in
the legal system. A notable exception, however, was Holmes's friend-like Holmes, a
founder of legal realism-Nicholas St. John Green. See note 22. An interest in such bias is a
defining characteristic of all forms of feminist jurisprudence.
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version of feminist jurisprudence. 45 She begins by describing a for-
malistic conception of law that she calls "legal liberalism" (critics
of liberalism like to assume that liberalism depends on a formalis-
tic approach to law); and she stresses the importance that the legal
liberal ascribes to individual liberty as a value served by law and
the legal liberal's dread of having his individuality submerged in
the community. The radical males of the critical legal studies
movement, she goes on to explain, relabel individuality as aliena-
tion and turn it from an object of longing to one of dread; and
relabeling annihilation as connection, they perform a similar inver-
sion of the liberal's dread. Women, however, differ fundamentally
from men in that their basic experience is not of individuality but
of connection because of pregnancy and breast-feeding, because
women are raised primarily by the parent of the same sex as theirs,
and because women are penetrated, rather than penetrating, in
sexual intercourse. The liberal feminist, who is basically satisfied
with this order of things, replaces the liberal legalist's value of au-
tonomy with the value of intimacy and the liberal legalist's dread
of annihilation with a dread of separation. The radical feminist,
however, longs for individuality (unlike the male radical) and
dreads not alienation but invasion, intrusion. 6
Here we may pause and consider whether any of this is true.
That is a large subject, to which I cannot begin to do justice here.
My tentative view is that there are only two significant (both prob-
ably innate) differences, on average (as always a very important
qualification), between men and women, in addition to the obvious
differences in primary and secondary sexual characteristics. First,
women tend to be less aggressive than men. Second, they tend to
be more devoted to their children. As Gilligan puts it in a recent
article, "stereotypes of males as aggressive and females as nur-
turant, however distorting and however limited, have some empiri-
cal claim. The overwhelmingly male composition of the prison pop-
ulation and the extent to which women take care of young children
cannot readily be dismissed as irrelevant to theories of morality or
excluded from accounts of moral development. If there are no sex
differences in empathy or moral reasoning, why are there sex dif-
ferences in moral and immoral behavior?"47 These differences
45 See West, 55 U Chi L Rev 1 (cited in note 34).
4' These relationships are summarized in a table in id at 37. Notice that West has in
effect divided what I am calling "fourth stage" feminism into a liberal and a radical variety.
One might similarly divide legal realism into conservative, liberal, and radical varieties.
Carol Gilligan and Grant Wiggins, The Origins of Morality in Early Childhood Rela-
216 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
could explain the greater attachment that the average man appears
to have to the job market than the average woman.
But what, if any, implications these differences have for the
law-beyond the trivial conjecture that women are less likely to be
excessively combative in litigation or to be willing to work the ab-
surd hours that are demanded of partners and associates at some
law firms-are obscure. Nor are these the differences that interest
West. But her idea that "connectedness" is the defining character-
istic of the female experience, and her attribution of this charac-
teristic to the female role in reproduction and child-rearing, are
neither well supported by empirical evidence nor, on the whole,
especially plausible. Most women do not appear to lack a sense of
themselves as individuals; nor is that sense diminished by preg-
nancy and breast-feeding. The point about penetration is particu-
larly unconvincing; it would make as much sense to describe the
female as ingesting as it does to describe the male as penetrating.
The fact that girls are raised primarily by the parent of the
same sex, and boys primarily by the parent of the opposite sex, is a
somewhat more plausible, though speculative, ground for thinking
that boys may grow up to be more individualistic than girls.48 So if
men assume a greater role in child-rearing, the male and female
outlooks may become more convergent. I expect they will become
more convergent anyway, as more and more women participate in
the labor force.
However the large questions are answered, it seems that
West's ambitions for feminist jurisprudence are, at least in the ar-
ticle under discussion, relatively modest ones. She doesn't aspire to
make law feminist, either in Gilligan's or Sherry's or Bender's
sense, or in West's own version of Gilligan's thesis. Mainly she
wants the law to become more protective of women's interests by
tionships, in Jerome Kagan and Sharon Lamb, eds, The Emergence of Morality in Young
Children 277, 278-79 (University of Chicago Press, 1987). Notice that the authors stop short
of describing these differences as genetic; nor need I so describe them in order to make my
point. For evidence supporting (with some qualifications) the passage quoted in the text, see
June Machover Reinisch and Stephanie A. Sanders, A Test of Sex Differences in Aggressive
Response to Hypothetical Conflict Situations, 50 J Personality & Soc Psych 1045 (1986);
Alice H. Eagly and Valerie J. Steffen, Gender and Aggressive Behavior: A Meta-Analytic
Review of the Social Psychological Literature, 100 Psych Bulletin 309 (1986); Alice H.
Eagly and Maureen Crowley, Gender and Helping Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of
the Social Psychological Literature, 100 Psych Bulletin 283 (1986). Also see note 37. The
possibility that the differences stressed by Gilligan may be at least partly biological in char-
acter is discussed in Alice S. Rossi, Gender and Parenthood, 49 Am Sociological Rev 1
(1984).
"' See Judith Lorber, et al, On "The Reproduction of Mothering": A Methodological
Debate, 6 Signs 482 (1981).
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recognizing the vulnerabilities that the woman's sense of connect-
edness creates."9 West wants lawyers, judges, and legislators to un-
derstand women's distinctive experience, just as blacks or Jews or
Asians or Mormons want the law to be sensitive to their own expe-
rience. A libertarian can hardly quarrel with this aspira-
tion-provided that West has identified what is indeed distinctive
in women's experience. But the implications for jurisprudence are
limited. Beyond that, it appears that West wants the legal system
to be more empathetic to all marginal groups, and again there can
be no quarrel with this desire. But the polarity between em-
pathetic, equitable, discretionary, situation-specific justice, on the
one hand, and the "rule of law" virtues of neutrality and "ruled-
ness," on the other, is far older than feminist jurisprudence.
Conservative feminism takes a more cautious stance on issues
of concern to women than radical or liberal feminism (I mean "lib-
eral" in the modern sense, for the libertarian considers himself or
herself the true, the classical, "liberal"). But I believe that it has
much to offer women-if only a warning to consider carefully the
indirect effects of policies ostensibly favoring women-and that it
deserves a greater voice in the feminist chorus.
See West, 55 U Chi L Rev at 58-72 (cited in note 34).
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